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care to avoid the pedestrian. The difference lies in the proof of negli-
gence. A different situation is presented when a right-of-way ordinance
is involved. Violation of such an ordinance by the motorist may consti-
tute negligence per se.' But such an ordinance must be unequivocal in
its terms in order to confer an absolute right on the pedestrian. In
Horwitz v. Eurove the Ohio Supreme Court held that an ordinance
which provided: "The right of way upon street crossings . . . shall,
in all cases, be given to pedestrians by all vehicles of every kind," created
only a preferential, not an absolute, right. In this it was consistent with
decisions in other jurisdictions.9
The question in these cases usually involves, not the defendant's
negligence, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Under
either view, the pedestrian must use due care to avoid injury in crossing.
If his right is only relative he must keep a lookout for automobiles, but
he has a right to assume that motorists will obey the light signals.'
If his right to cross is absolute his duty to look out may be lessened.
Some cases dealing with a pedestrian's right of way have said that he
need not keep a continuous lookout.1 ' Where a statute exists, the pedes-
trian has a right to assume that the motorist will obey it."
While a doctrine giving the pedestrian an absolute right would have
the merit of certainty and be more easily applied, it would seem that the
rule of the principal case is more nearly in accord with the usual practice
at street crossings and gives to the plaintiff all that he should reasonably
expect. R. C. H.
TORTS - PROXIMATE CAUSE AND PER SE NEGLIGENCE
A city ordinance of Warren, Ohio, provided that vehicular traffic
was entitled to the right of way between intersections, but that such
provision should not operate to relieve drivers of due care for the safety
of pedestrians.' The plaintiff was struck and injured by the defendant's
automobile, as he attempted to make a crossing between intersections.
Testimony indicated that the automobile was moving at an excessive
aSchell v. DuBoise, adm'r, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, 1917A A.L.R. 710 (1916).
SHorwitz v. Eurove, 129 Ohio St. 8, 193 N.E. 644, 96 A.L.R. 782 (1934).
o Rolfs v. Mullins, 179 Iowa 1223, 16z N.W. 783 (917); Bora v. Yellow Cab Co.,
103 N. J. Law 377, I35 Atl. 88q (1927).
'0 Cleveland Ry. v. Goldman, supra, note 6.
"Newman v. Protective Motor Service, z98 Pa. S09, 148 Ati. 71 (930); Grif-
fith v. Slaybaugh, 29 F. (2d) 437 (1928).
'Hart v. Devereux, 41 Ohio St. (1885); Norris v. Jones, 99o Ohio St. 9S,
144 N.E. 274 (1924).
'The Warren ordinance, enacted in 1929: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at
any point other than within a marked or unmarked crosswalk shall yield the right of way
to vehicles on the roadway, provided that this provision shall not relieve the driver of a
vehicle from the duty to exercise due care for the safety of pedestrians." (Italics added)
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rate of speed, that the plaintiff had looked in both directions before
starting to cross, but that he (the plaintiff) had not, after seeing the
approaching car some 255 feet away, again looked in that direction.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the
plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. The motion was overruled,
as was a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and judgment was entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. This
judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County,
the court ruling that the violation of a safety ordinance was negligence
per se which barred recovery as a matter of law. In view of a conflict-
ing decision by another appellate court,2 the cause was certified to the
Supreme Court. A majority of the highest court upheld the ruling of
the trial judge, saying that, although the plaintiff was negligent per se
the problem of proximate cause was one of fact which was properly for
the jury.'
It seems well established in Ohio that the violation of a statute or
ordinance passed for the protection of the public is negligence per se.4
The rule has been applied many times in cases involving "right of way"
ordinances similar to the one construed in Smith v. Zone Cabs.' In view
of these apparently consistent holdings, the court in the principal case
declared the pedestrian negligent as a matter of law. It remained to
inquire whether such negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.'
Where reasonable minds might differ, this is a question of fact for the
jury.' A pedestrian does not forfeit his right to prove that his injuries
were caused proximately by the negligence of another, and not by his
own failure to meet a standard of due care, merely through his violation
of a safety ordinance designed to protect human life.'
Do the facts of the instant case (and others of like character) pre-
sent a problem of causal relation upon which reasonable minds might
differ? A city ordinance grants a right of way to vehicular traffic
between intersections. A pedestrian violates this right of way by walking
into the street. He is struck by an automobile, and suffers injury. By
Mlanspergcr v. Ehrnficld, 59 Ohio App. 74, 17 N.E. (2d) 27x (937).
'Smith v. Zone Cabs, 135 Ohio St. 41S, 2x N.E. (ad) 336, 14 Ohio Op. 316 (x939).
'ScUcll v. Du Bols Admr., 94. Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, L.R.A. 1917 A, 710
(1916)i Taaghcr et al. v. Ling, 127 Ohio St. x42, 187 N.E. 19 (1933); Portage Mar-
kets Co. v. George, xix Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924).
'SSmith v. Zone Cabs, supra, note 3; Standard Motor Sales Co. v. Miller, 30 Ohio
App. 7, x64 N.E. SS (19z8); Horwitz v. Eurove, 129 Ohio St. 8, 193 N.E. 644 (1934).
4 In Martin v. Herzog, z28 N. Y. 164, x6 N.E. 814 (1920), where a car traveling
on the wrong side of the highway struck a buggy without lights, Cardozo, J., said: "We
must be on our guard, however, against confusing the question of negligence with that of
the causal connection between the negligence and the injury."
7 Sharp v. Russell, 37 Ohio App. 306, 174 N.E. 617 (1930); Restatement of the
Lams', Torts, tcc. 476.
'4 Sell1 v. Du Bois, Adnz'r., supra, note 4.
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and large, although exceptional circumstances may be imagined, this
set of facts (the principal case) was contemplated by the authors of
the ordinance. Effective causal connection between violation and injury
seems inescapable. Proximate cause, if the term has any real meaning,
is too evident to be denied. If the question of proximate causation, under
circumstances such as these, is one of fact for the jury, the term becomes
one of convenience rather than real utility. Reasonable minds could not
differ upon any but unique circumstances.9
If it be assumed that the final word has been spoken concerning
per se negligence in cases of this character, the action of the court in
refusing to say that this plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause
of his injuries as a matter of law may be defended on the ground that
it gives effect-by invoking the issue of proximate cause-to the mani-
fest purpose of the statute. If, as a matter of law, an injured pedestrian
is denied recovery from a negligent driver because of his (the pedes-
trian's) per se negligence in the violation of a safety ordinance, the
purpose of the enactment is thwarted, and it imperils human life while
purporting to protect it. The pedestrian, prior to enactment, might at
least show that his own conduct did not constitute negligence. If negli-
gence and causation are both conclusively proved by the mere showing
that he did, in fact, violate an ordinance intended to protect him by
defining and limiting his right to cross streets, the enactment for his
benefit has operated to his detriment. It has placed the offending pedes-
trian at the mercy of the negligent driver.
The per se negligence doctrine has been applied without fundamental
refinement to violations of various statutes in Ohio. In Sharp v. Rus-
sell,'" the violation of G.C. secs. 631o-22 and 6310-27, respecting
signals when stopping and place of stopping on the highway, was held
to be negligence per se. The same principle has been applied to G.C.
sec. 126o3 which provides that a driver must be able to stop within the
assured clear distance ahead." The violation of specific speed statutes
was termed per se negligence in Schell v. Du Bois."2 However, enough
variation may be found in the decisions of Ohio, and other courts, to
make speculation as to further exceptions to the rule of per se negligence
9 GREENE, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSEr, p. 13z: "Causal relation is one of fact.
It is always for the jury, except when the facts are such that they will support only one
reasonable inference. The courts as a matter of theory all agree so far. The exception
obtains in the great majority of cases, as the facts are so clear that no issue is raised as
to causal relation."
"o Sharp v. Russell, supra, note 7.
"'Skinner v. Penna. Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722, 13 Ohio L. Abs. S9
(xp93).
'z Schell v. Du Bois Admr., supra, note 45 Allen v. Smith, 5 Ohio App. Z84, 27
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 203 (zp16).
:to8
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useful. It has been held that driving in excess of the limits set up in the
Ohio speed statute, G.C. sec. 12603, is not negligence per se. 3 This
construction was necessary to preserve the expressed intent of the statute,
that driving in excess of the specific limit was only prima facie unlawful.
This indicates that the Ohio courts will deviate from the established rule
under the pressure of a precisely worded statute. In W'Vitherspoon v.
Irons, 4 crossing a street within ten feet of a crosswalk-in violation of
an ordinance-was held not to be negligence as a matter of law.
Further exception was taken in Misrach v. Epperson," and in Fight-
master v. Mode," where the courts in distinguishing the cases used lan-
guage commonly employed in discussing simple negligence problems,
when negligence is a matter of fact to be proved and violation of a
statute is only part of the proof. In Horwitz v. Eurove," the court, in
dealing with a right of way ordinance, described it as creating a pref-
erential rather than an absolute right-a view which is hardly compatible
with the concept of per se negligence. The Ohio case farthest removed
from the general idea that violation of an ordinance for public protection
is negligence per se, is Mansperger v. Ehrnfield." Here, the effect of
an ordinance similar to the one under consideration in the principal case
was analyzed, and it was held that such an ordinance does not relieve a
driver of the duty to exercise due care, that the contributory negligence
of the violator is not a matter of law, but a question for jury determi-
nation.
A careful perusal of the entire majority opinion in Smith v. Zone
Cabs, reveals that the court may not be adhering as closely to the per
se negligence rule as the first sentences of the opinion indicate. After
enunciating the rule, granting negligence, and reserving proximate cause
for the jury, it launches into a discussion calculated to disprove the negli-
gence of the pedestrian, citing cases upon the problems of continuous
observation, judgment of the driver's speed, etc. Although this does not
disturb the manifest position of the court, it does reflect doubt as to the
tenability of the view which holds pedestrians who violate ordinances
of this character to be negligent per se.
Courts in other jurisdictions have held diversely on the point. Some
have assumed the position generally adopted by the Ohio courts, that
" Swoboda v. Brown, x29 Ohio St. 512, x96 N.E. z74 (x935); Lazzara v. Hart,
45 Ohio App. 368, 187 N.E. 19
o
, x4 Ohio L. Abs. 563 (i933).
SWithcrspoo v. Irons, iS Ohio L. Abs. 193 (1934).
' Misrach v. Eppcrson, 32 Ohio App. 451, 168 N.E. Z30 (8929).
". Figbirmastcr v. Mode, 31 Ohio App. 273, 167 N.E. 407, 30 Ohio L. Rep. 281
('9zs).
7 Horowitz v. Euro ve, supra, note S.
jl Manspcrger v. Ehrnfield, supra, note z.
x Smith v'. Zone Cabs, supra, note 3.
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violation of a right of way ordinance is negligence per se.2" Other juris-
dictions say that such ordinances impose upon the pedestrian a duty to
exercise greater care, or give rise to an obligation of continuous obser-
vation, but these courts insist that the driver is not relieved of his duty
to exercise due care for the safety of the offending pedestrian. 2' To hold
otherwise is to negative a clear intent that the ordinance "shall not
relieve the driver of a vehicle from the duty to exercise due care for
the safety of pedestrians," and to leave the pedestrian who has inad-
vertently invaded the vehicular right of way, without remedy against
the driver who negligently injures him, unless proximate cause be sub-
mitted to the jury and resolved in his favor. R. M. A.
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS - SUABILITY OF
LABOR UNIONS
In an action against an international unincorporated association of
railroad engineers by one of its members for damages resulting from a
claimed dereliction of duty of certain officers of the union, the court in
a dictum said that the association is suable if a proper foundation is laid,
basing its statement on the cases following United Mine Workers of
.merica v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 57o, 66 L.
Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762 (1922) and on Ohio G.C. sec. 11257.
McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers, 59 Ohio App. 477, 12 Ohio Op. III, 18 N.E. (2d) 812
(1938)-
The decision turned on another point, but the court's statement
raises the important question of the suability of voluntary associations
in general and unincorporated labor unions in particular. It is well
settled at common law that a voluntary association is not a legal entity
distinct from that of its members. Thus, at common law, an unincor-
porated labor union could not sue or be sued in its association name, but
every member of the labor union had to be made a party to the action.'
o'Koeppelv.Daluiso, Ia8 Cal. App. 44z, 5 P. (zd) 457 (293).
"2Ivy v. Marx, 2o5 Ala. 6o, 87 So. 813, 14 A.L.R. 1173 (gzo): "the ordinance
was certainly passed with a view to protect human life, and to give the ordinance a con-
struction which would sanction a relaxation of vigilance on the part of drivers of auto-
mobiles upon the public streets would run counter to its evident intent." Rhimer v. Davis,
sz6 Wash. 470, ziS Par. 193 (9zo); W. B. Bassett & Co. v. Ward, 246 Va. 654, 13Z
S.E. 700 (z926); Webb-Pepploe v. Cooper, '59 Md. 426, 151 At. 235 (2930); Saunders
v. Yellow Cab Co., 18z Minn. 62, 233 N.W. 599 (2930)
'Cahill v. Plumbers, Gas and Steam Fitters' and Helpers' Local 93, 238 Il. App.
123 (1925); Varnado v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933); WARREN, COR-
PORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPOrATION, (2929) pp. 667-8; Note (938) 26
Georgetown L. J. 999, 2o0-z; Note (2937) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 2035 27 A.L.R. 786
(2gz2); 2 Brit. Rul. Case 85z.
